<maos-app> container — spec vNext

Browser-only MUST • minimaal laden • maximale veiligheid • IWA-ready • status: ontwerp, nog geen code

Keuze in 1 zin: eigen container als wrapper om iframe + SharedWorker + Service Worker, DApps praten alleen met window.maos, nooit direct met browser/kernel. Backend nu iframe, later IWA zonder DApps te breken.

1. Architectuur (3-tier)

DApp (IPFS CID) ──postMessage(MessageChannel)──▶ <maos-app> ──▶ SharedWorker VAPI-router ──▶ kernel/Hono
        │                                                  │                     │
        │ iframe sandbox, opaque origin                     │ capability-check    │ SW: verified-fetch + CID-cache
        └── window.maos.request() SDK ─────────────────────┘                     └── server-only: mint/stripe/DID
LaagTaakWaarom hier
IframeUI renderen, SDK-shimEnige echte DOM-isolatie in browser
SharedWorkerVAPI-router + permissies + cryptoLeeft bij open tabs, deelt state, SW sterft na ~30s
Service WorkerIPFS verify + immutable cache + fallbackFetch-laag, geen RPC (geen dynamic import)

2. Trust-tiers

Tier-0 systeem
wallet, settings, permissions. Direct in shell, geen iframe. Vite-code + review.
Tier-1 verified
Eigen store, signed + audit. Iframe + allow-same-origin, preloaded bridge, SW-cache.
Tier-2 third-party (default, 10k-schaal)
Iframe strict sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups" zonder allow-same-origin. Opaque origin. Alles via Worker-capabilities.

3. Container API

<maos-app cid="bafy…" version="1.4.2" tier="2"></maos-app>
<script>
  const el = document.querySelector('maos-app');
  await el.spawn();            // resolve → verify → iframe + port
  el.suspend(); el.resume();   // hibernate: port bevriezen, iframe uit DOM
  el.destroy();                // port revoke = instant kill
  el.oncaprevoked = (c) => ui.badge(c); // permissie ingetrokken
</script>

Lifecycle: resolve → verify → spawn → attest → mount → [suspend ↔ resume] → destroy. Attest = manifest-handtekening + CID-match, anders geen mount.

4. DApp SDK (enige API voor DApps)

// in iframe, 8KB shim, geen window.ethereum direct
const sig = await maos.request('wallet:sign', { tx });   // → Worker checkt capability
const file = await maos.request('storage:read', { path });
const res = await maos.fetch('https://api.allowlist…', opts); // allowlist uit manifest
maos.on('capability-revoked', cb);

5. Manifest + signing

{ "name":"…", "cid":"bafy…", "vapi":"1.x",
  "capabilities":{ "wallet:sign":true, "storage:read":true, "network:fetch":["https://…"] },
  "sig":"ed25519:…" }

Check 2x: Hono bij publish/register + SharedWorker bij elke call. Geen sig = geen mount. vapi:"1.x" = kernel blijft 2 minors backwards compatible.

6. Security-verplicht

7. Minimaal laden

8. Bouwen (.maos bundle) + server

apps/dapps/<naam>/ ──vite-plugin-maos──▶ dist/ ──▶ manifest.json + .sig ──▶ IPFS CID ──▶ Hono register
Vite: worker:{format:'es'}, ?sharedworker voor router, ?worker voor wallet/vfs/chain
Hono: /api/dapps, /api/ipfs/[cid], /api/kernel, /api/vapi — export type AppType → hc() client

9. IWA-pad (later, geen breuk)

Zelfde signing + CSP + bundle-vorm als .swbn. Shell kan later als isolated-app:// installeren (ChromeOS-managed). DApps blijven IPFS-dynamisch — IWA verbiedt nu remote code, dus DApps niet in shell bundelen.

10. Ombouw-mappen (docs/os-vNext/)

MapInhoudBron nu
os/shell, window-manager, lifecycleapps/core/src/app, components, desktop-features
kernel/orchestrator, VAPI-handlers, sessies, permissiessrc/orchestrator, src/vapi (60+ handlers)
container/deze spec + bridge + SDK + manifest-schemasrc/shared/dapp-bridge.ts, workers/dapp-*
dapps/tier-1/2 DApps, store, publish-flowapps/dapps, packages/cli (publish/build)
system-apps/tier-0: wallet, settings, permissions, bootsrc/boot, src/auth, lib/stores
ipfs/gateway, pinning, verified-fetch SWapi/ipfs/[cid], apps/ipfs*
api/Hono-routes + middleware (Fase 1)42× route.ts + proxy.ts
Volgende stap Na akkoord: P0-tickets (container-shim → SharedWorker-router → Hono-extractie safe movers) met acceptatie per stuk.